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Confirmation bias is persistently devastating to rational judgment and decision-making. Previous 
research supports cognitive and behavioral distinctions between two types of confirmation bias: 
motivated confirmation bias and unmotivated confirmation bias. Motivated confirmation bias is a 
member of the larger class of motivated reasoning biases. These often occur when one’s 
individual or group identity is tied up in certain beliefs or propositions that command one’s 
assent. Prior research has shown that even when individuals possess cognitive problem-solving 
skills such as high numeracy, these skills offer no benefit to rational thinking or judgment in the 
face of motivated reasoning problem sets. Prior research has also shown that dopaminergic genes 
DRD2, DARPP-32, and COMT are predictive of susceptibility to unmotivated confirmation bias; 
however, the role of these genes in motivated confirmation bias had yet to be tested. The present 
investigation examined the possible connection. Participants were 200 university students who 
completed questionnaires and tasks assessing motivated confirmation bias, numeracy, political 
philosophy and party identification. Logistic regression modeled the association of these 
measures with accuracy on a bias detection task. Numeracy predicted accuracy; however, 
genotypes and political measures did not. These results suggest that distinct genetic determinants 
are responsible for motivated and unmotivated confirmation bias. Further, the findings replicated 
previous research demonstrating that accuracy is much diminished in the motivated scenario 
compared to an unmotivated control. However, contrary to this earlier work, the current findings 
suggest that numeracy confers a benefit in both motivated and unmotivated conditions, rather 
than just in motivated situations. Overall, these findings suggest continued research is needed to 
uncover the neurobiological determinants of motivated confirmation bias.  
 Keywords: Motivated confirmation bias, DRD2, DARPP-32, COMT, numeracy.
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Dopaminergic Genes Predictive of Unmotivated Confirmation Bias are Not Predictive of  
 
Motivated Confirmation Bias  
 
Biases and heuristics are cognitive shortcuts or tools we use to navigate complex 
environments. They are often used when there is not enough information available to make a 
more educated decision, not enough time to weigh out evidence for or against, not enough 
severity of consequences to justify thinking over testing, or not enough likelihood that one’s 
belief is wrong to justify reexamining it. One of the two key features that make cognitive biases 
and heuristics so useful and often used is that they are highly reliable—i.e., they usually lead us 
to the correct solution. The other key feature behind their utility is that they are fast—even 
automatic. As a consequence, and added benefit, biases and heuristics require less cognitive 
resources than deliberative consideration of alternatives.  
These and other benefits of cognitive biases and heuristics are often overlooked because 
they are typically studied in the contexts in which they go wrong—when they lead to suboptimal 
beliefs, decision-making, and outcomes. While cognitive biases and heuristics usually reach 
optimal outcomes, they also fail in certain cases where the outcome is substantial. For this 
reason, researchers in the judgment and decision-making field of cognitive psychology have 
sought to discover ways in which to overcome biases and stop reliance on heuristics where 
circumstances dictate. These are typically circumstances in which the outcome of a decision is 
significant enough to warrant the work and resources of more deliberative thought. 
Strategies and Interventions for Augmenting Cognition 
There are two main approaches to augmenting cognition in the face of biases and 
heuristics: training- or teaching-based interventions meant to change the way one thinks, or 
instead, accepting the way one thinks and redesigning user interfaces and information 
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presentation to reach different outcomes. This latter approach is a human factors approach. It 
uses cognitive psychology to design products and systems that optimize user behavior. One 
example of this approach is seen in the presentation of health risk information (see Garcia-
Retamero and Cokely, 2013 for review). Garcia-Retamero and Cokely (2011) developed an 
intervention (an informational brochure) to augment sexually transmitted infection (STI) risk 
awareness. Inaccurate risk perceptions are often due to cognitive biases and heuristics, including 
the availability heuristic, representativeness heuristic, anchoring, and framing effects, among 
others. The availability heuristic is used in this context when one judges the likelihood of an 
outcome based on the ease with which examples come to mind (Schwarz et al., 1991). The 
representativeness heuristic is used when one judges that the likelihood of an outcome is 
predicted by outcomes of a similar type or outcomes that followed similar antecedent conditions, 
e.g. thinking that a medical condition will improve on its own because previous medical 
conditions did so (Read & Grushka-Cockayne, 2011). Anchoring bias occurs in the context of 
risk perception when perceptions of present and future risks are biased by information about the 
frequency and severity of past risks (Lieder, et al., 2018). Such information need not be first-
hand and may even be false. Framing effects bias risk perception when information is provided 
such that it limits perceptions of, and responses to, a problem (Druckman, 2001). Framing effects 
were famously demonstrated by Tversky and Khaneman (1981) with a contagious disease 
response paradigm. Participants read a problem that stated the United States would soon face an 
outbreak of an Asian disease and 600 fatalities were expected. Participants then chose one of two 
response programs based on their expected outcomes. These responses were presented 
differently in two conditions: a “saved” condition, and a “die” condition. In the “saved” 
condition, participants read that under program A, 200 lives would be saved, while under 
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program B, there was a 1/3 probability that all 600 people would be saved, and a 2/3 probability 
that none would be saved. In the “die” condition, participants read that under program C, 400 
people would die, while under program D, there was a 1/3 probability that no one would die, and 
a 2/3 probability that all would die. Across the two conditions, Programs A and C, and Programs 
B and D, were probabilistically equivalent, e.g. 200 people would be saved (Program A), 400 
people would die (Program C).  However, in the “save” condition, 72% of participants chose 
Program A, whereas in the “die” condition, only 22% of participants chose the equivalent 
program: Program C. The “save” condition was framed such that it promoted risk-averse 
responses. The “die” condition was framed such that it promoted risk-taking responses.  
Similarly, Garcia-Retamero and Cokely (2011) showed that framing effects had different 
consequences on sexual behavior; specifically, gain-framed messages were more successful in 
fostering STI preventative behaviors, whereas loss-framed messages were more successful in 
fostering illness-detection behaviors like health screenings. More importantly, they showed that 
the two framing conditions could be made not only equally, but also more behaviorally effective 
simply by adding visual aids. Other successful interventions are often similarly simple. For 
example, Hales and Pronovost (2006) demonstrated the utility of procedural checklists in error 
avoidance in the face of cognitive challenges exacerbated by stress and fatigue. They can help, 
for example, in overcoming inaccurate initial diagnoses that lead to confirmation biases from 
which information contradicting the initial diagnosis is ignored, and confirmatory information is 
sought (Mendel et al., 2011). 
A more controversial intervention to mitigate cognitive bias is incentivizing certain 
behaviors. Smith and Walker (1993) incentivized normative or neutral (Nash equilibrium) 
auction bids with a payoff of $250.00. They found that the payoff opportunity increased the 
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amount of cognitive work participants undertook to reason out the normative bid. In a review of 
monetary incentives in experimental research, however, Camerer and Hogarth (1999) found the 
opposite, as well as that such incentives introduced several experimental confounds. Hogarth et 
al. (1991) also found that financial incentives merely encourage people to pursue their strategies, 
biased or otherwise, with greater resolve.  
Another type of cognitive bias intervention is the social influence or “nudge” approach 
advocated by Thaler and Sunstine (2009) wherein one seeks to change biased and incorrect 
beliefs and their resulting behaviors. An example of this approach is influencing beliefs and 
behaviors about smoking by implementing public messaging that suggests the majority of people 
do not smoke and that even those who do smoke want to stop smoking (Marteau et al., 2011). 
Other examples from Marteau et al. (2011) include countering over-consumption of alcohol by 
using smaller serving glasses at restaurants and bars, and countering obesity by making side 
salads, rather than French fries, the regular side item. In the financial compliance domain, Castro 
and Scartascini (2013), sought to improve rates of tax compliance in a developing municipal 
economy in Argentina by modifying beliefs in three areas: levels of enforcement of tax 
compliance, level of equity in tax compliance, and levels of fairness in the tax system itself. 
They found no effect with public messaging about equity and fairness; however, they discovered 
that simply informing municipal residents of the legal consequences and associated fines for 
noncompliance increased compliance significantly. Altering beliefs in this way is a double-edged 
sword. While nudging can be used to overcome false and biased beliefs, it can also be used to 
create false and biased beliefs, even if for a common good, thereby raising ethical questions 
about the approach (Nys & Engelen, 2017). While young smokers’ risk perceptions about 
smoking are likely inaccurate and biased by availability and similarity heuristics, nudging might 
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counter those by creating opposing biases beliefs, for example, that smokers are socially 
undesirable.  
Training-based interventions are more varied. They include training in logic, statistics 
and bias awareness among many others (Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997; Fischoff, 1982; Niu et 
al., 2013). One of the hurdles for training interventions is that individuals and organizations can 
be resistant to debiasing efforts (Arkes, 2003). Most training regimens show improvement in 
cognitive performance in the short term and immediate context; however, they usually run into 
the same two hurdles: gains are unlasting and context dependent (Fong & Nisbett, 1991). In 
studies where participants are retested weeks or months after training, gains have either 
significantly diminished or returned to pre-training levels. The second challenge is that of 
domain transfer: gains in laboratory or classroom settings are diminished or undetectable when 
trainees face real-world problems (Hogarth, 2001; Kagel & Levin, 1986). Subjects with training 
in critical thinking show little improvement in normative thinking (Niu et al., 2013). Mowen & 
Gaeth (1992) reported slight improvement in participants who were trained in the cognitive 
mechanisms underlying biased decision making; however, as with critical thinking, the material 
proved difficult to teach to nonexperts.  
One approach that avoids the domain transfer problem is the use of domain-dependent 
strategies and cognitive “tricks” like using the wisdom of the crowd to inform one’s judgment 
(Mannes et al., 2012). This only works in circumstances where the crowd consists of members 
who have relevant pieces of information about the problem, all of which will point toward the 
same solution, and false beliefs about the problem which point in many different directions, all 
of which will cancel one another out (Atanasov et al., 2017). Another such trick applies to the 
pick-a-door problem. When given a problem in which one must choose between three or more 
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options, for example, when one chooses Door Number One, Two, or Three, and has no basis on 
which to select one over the other, a person can improve their odds of successfully choosing the 
“correct” door merely by choosing one door and then changing one’s answer (Herzog & 
Hertwig, 2009). This is counterintuitive, but it works because the likelihood that the first choice 
is correct is only 33%; while the likelihood the correct door is one of the other two doors is 67%. 
Thus, one necessarily improves one’s odds by changing the original choice.  
Aczel et al. (2015) showed that training in analogical thinking was beneficial in 
combating the domain transfer problem. Analogical thinking is the use of one problem with a 
known solution as an analogy by which to solve another problem with an unknown solution. In 
their experiment, participants were placed in three conditions: a no training control group, a bias 
awareness training group, and an analogical thinking training group. Only the analogical training 
group showed significant improvement over pretraining testing when retested one month later. 
The retest covered the same biases as the pretest; however, it set those biases in different 
domains than those used on the pretest. The authors reasoned that analogical reasoning was 
effective in addressing domain transfer because it requires an understanding of the underlying 
logic that is common across problems in distinct domains. Vendetti et al. (2014) relied on the 
same reasoning in developing an experimental intervention that used analogical reasoning 
problems themselves as a tool to promote a broader analogical reasoning mindset to overcome 
limitations in domain transfer. As with Aczel et al. (2015), improvements were statistically 
significant and effect sizes were modest. In sum, numerous interventions to counter cognitive 
biases have been developed and tested without great success. This suggests some deeper 
understanding of the cognitive and neurological mechanisms underlying biases may be 
warranted.  
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Confirmation Bias 
Confirmation bias is a much-studied cognitive bias that is persistently devastating to 
rational judgment and decision-making. Cognitively, it can take many forms, most commonly 
noticing and remembering confirmatory information while not noticing or not remembering 
contrary information. Behaviorally, confirmation bias is seen in how a person differentially 
interacts with confirmatory and contrary information. In consuming highly polarizing political 
information, for example, it is seen in seeking out information that confirms one’s beliefs and 
avoiding information that contradicts one’s beliefs. Interactions with confirmatory information 
can feel pleasurable, while interactions with contrary information can feel painful. 
Neurobiologically, imaging studies show that interactions with information that changes strongly 
held political beliefs are accompanied by activity in self-monitoring and emotion related areas 
(Kaplan et al., 2016).  
There is not a single, agreed upon, definition of confirmation bias, and some experts use 
the term to refer to a class of biases (Nickerson, 1998). Charness & Dave (2017) give a threefold 
definition of confirmation bias that includes seeking, interpreting, and using information to 
support one’s prior beliefs. Yariv (2002) includes the phenomenon in which people update their 
beliefs in order to view their past actions more favorably. Nickerson (1998) includes a variety of 
phenomena including hypothesis-driven information seeking and interpretation, restriction of 
attention to a favored hypothesis, treating confirmatory evidence preferentially, and 
overweighting confirming evidence, among others. Nickerson (1998) also argues that unwitting 
or unconscious confirmation bias is an essential component of the concept (Fischoff, 1982). Yet, 
while many studies demonstrate unconscious confirmation bias; awareness of the bias does not 
appear to diminish it. 
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Klayman (1995) describes a class of biases held together by a common propensity of 
over-belief in one’s preferred opinions. For Klayman, the class of confirmation bias includes the 
specific biases of positive hypothesis testing (Klayman & Ha, 1987), wherein one searches for 
belief-confirming evidence, and the availability heuristic, wherein the search of one’s own 
memory more readily produces instances that confirm expectations. Importantly, search styles, 
like searching for confirming evidence rather than disconfirming evidence, are not necessarily 
biased or suboptimal in many circumstances (Friedrich, 1993). Nevertheless, they can produce 
bias when one stops testing examples and concludes that the positive cases are sufficient to 
support the desired conclusion. This phenomenon can be observing in the rule discovery 
paradigm first used by Wason (1960). Subjects were given sets of three numbers or “triples” (e.g. 
2, 4, 6) and asked to identify the rule to which the numbers adhered, much like a pattern 
recognition question on a standardized test. Subjects tested their hypotheses by proposing 
additional triples and an experimenter indicated whether the new triple obeyed the rule. Subjects 
stopped when they were highly confident that they had discovered the rule. Wason found that the 
participants tended to propose triples that fit their hypothesized rule. In doing so, they sought 
confirmation of their hypotheses, and they expected that the triples they proposed would fit the 
rule. This strategy, also called positive testing, was suboptimal, not least because Wason’s rule 
was broader than most suspected—namely, any sequence that increases. Any one triple (e.g. 2, 4, 
6), however, conforms with many rules: the numbers are positive, the numbers are single digit, 
the numbers are even, the numbers increase by two, etc. Thus, a participant might propose 
several examples, find that they all are correct instances of their hypothesized rule, and then 
falsely conclude that they have enough evidence to identify the rule. In this case, participants 
often propose examples such as 8, 10, 12. The experimenter confirms that these numbers fit the 
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rule, and so the participant concludes the rule is “increases by two.” The more general the rule, 
the more difficult it is to discover it by positive testing alone. Rules such as “the numbers are 
Arabic numerals, the numbers are numbers, the numbers are any three things and needn’t be 
numbers are all,” would be very difficult to discover using only positive tests as one’s search 
strategy.  
Some authors consider positive hypothesis testing to be an example of confirmation bias 
because in using it, the individual is attempting to confirm their own beliefs or bias. Klayman & 
Ha (1989) among others, argue that the use of positive hypothesis tests does not necessitate that 
one is trying to “prove” the tested hypothesis. Subjects have even used positive hypothesis tests 
to seek to disconfirm a hypothesis, as in attempting to show the any-ascending-sequence rule as 
false by offering an extreme triple like “-100, 0, 105” (Klayman & Ha, 1989). In their view, it is 
not the positive test search strategy only that makes for confirmation bias; rather, it is the 
conclusion that one has sufficient information from this search strategy to stop collecting data. 
Positive hypothesis testing is, nevertheless, often an inferior strategy because it can only 
uncover false positives—triples one expects to work but which fail. Negative hypothesis testing 
or seeking to disconfirm, is usually a more optimal strategy because it can uncover false 
negatives—triples one expects to fail but which work. This reveals more information about the 
underlying rule, and it does so more quickly and efficiently (Klayman, 1995).  
The feature that defines an optimal strategy is the environment; specifically, whether the 
environment is one in which false positives or false negatives are more consequential and more 
in need of discovery. A common example of a case where false positives are more consequential 
and hence positive testing is more optimal, is that of car buying. Buying a lemon is a greater risk 
than missing out on reliable cars (Friedrich, 1993). 
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Klayman (1995) also argued that the well-educated are not immune from instances of 
confirmation bias. In a study by Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979), death penalty proponents and 
adversaries evaluated the same body of evidence and each concluded that the evidence supported 
their positions. More, the evidence used in the study, which was mixed, further entrenched each 
side. Both appeared to seize on the confirming pieces alone and disregard information that 
detracted from their views. Plous (1991) made a similar finding with advocates and detractors of 
new technologies when interpreting a technology’s performance data. Skeptics of a new 
technology interpreted the performance data as further evidence for their skepticism of the 
technological product. Advocates of the new technology interpreted the same performance data 
as supporting their own view.  
Koehler (1993) made a similar finding among scientists. In Koehler’s study, the 
participants were a group who advocated for the scientific study of parapsychology and another 
group that aimed to refute parapsychological claims. The participants were tasked with 
evaluating the methodology of a number of studies that reached different conclusions about 
parapsychology—a matter logically distinct from the claims themselves. Nevertheless, each side 
tended to more readily approve of the methodologies of studies whose conclusions were 
consistent with their beliefs, and more readily criticized the methodologies of studies that 
reached conclusions that opposed their beliefs. The study is an example of a more general 
phenomenon; scientists are less skeptical of evidence that supports their beliefs than they are of 
evidence that is inconsistent with their beliefs. For example, professional audiences who read 
peer-reviewed studies do not equally discount studies in which the data are believed to be flawed 
in some way. Rather, confirmatory flawed data are more readily believed than flawed data that 
contradicts one’s prior beliefs (Gorman, 1986, 1989). 
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Two Types of Confirmation Bias 
Prior research supports cognitive and behavioral distinctions between two types of 
confirmation bias: motivated confirmation bias and unmotivated confirmation bias (Kunda, 
1990; Nickerson, 1998). Motivated confirmation bias is a member of the larger class of 
motivated reasoning biases (Haidt, 2001; Kunda, 1990). These often occur when an individual or 
group identity is tied up in certain beliefs or propositions that command assent. However, 
confirmation bias can operate independently of any of the properties of motivated reasoning, 
such as the desire to prove or defend a hypothesis or fear of a competing hypothesis. Both 
Wason’s rule discovery task (1960) (discussed above) and card selection task (1968) serve as 
examples of a common preference for positive or confirmatory test strategies over disconfirming 
strategies. However, this occurs in the absence of a motivated reasoning component. Even 
though subjects who used positive testing as a search strategy sought to confirm a specific 
hypothesis, they had no loyalty to such a hypothesis, and the failure of the hypothesis was no 
threat to their identity, broader goals, or values. Thus, the rule discovery task shows that 
confirmation bias need not be motivated to prove a hypothesis in order to count as confirmation 
bias. This is true even if one agrees with Klayman and Ha (1989) that use of the positive test 
strategy alone is insufficient to count as confirmation bias, and that some conclusion about 
having made a sufficient search to discover the rule is required.  
More recent investigations of confirmation bias also demonstrate that it need not take the 
motivated form. In fact, unmotivated confirmation bias is often studied because it is easier to 
induce and control experimentally. Work from Doll et al. (2011) used a probability task in which 
playing cards with novel symbols were played head-to-head. Participants were instructed to 
select between two playing cards the one with the highest probability of being the winning card. 
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Cards had an assigned probability of winning prior to the task, yet participants were given 
inaccurate instructions about which cards were most likely to win. Although feedback from each 
trial was immediate—that is, the participants saw whether the cards they selected won or lost—
some participants did not learn the true probabilities observed via these outcomes and instead 
persisted in complying with the erroneous instructions. Other participants were successful at 
learning throughout the task despite the instructions and adjusted their play to achieve better 
outcomes. In other words, some participants were more susceptible to confirmation bias than 
others. However, none of the participants in this task had any vested interest in proving that 
certain cards turn out to be more probable winners than others. The outcome did not engage any 
emotional commitments such as their individual or group identities. 
Somewhere between these extreme cases of unmotivated and motivated confirmation bias 
are cases where motivation creeps into the task process. Scherer et al. (2012) demonstrated a 
phenomenon known as post-prediction selection bias, wherein making a prediction biases 
subsequent information searches. Scherer et al. (2013) expanded on this and showed that a 
completely arbitrary hypothesis, on a topic on which a person knows nothing, is also sufficient to 
bias future information searches.  An arbitrary hypothesis can become a preferred hypothesis 
motivating confirmation bias merely by the participant predicting that the hypothesis is true. In 
their experiment, participants viewed two paintings, displayed side-by-side, and then indicated 
which painting’s original form they thought was better liked by college students. The “original 
form” description was included to make the choice even more arbitrary. Participants then 
selected articles to read from a list provided by the experimenters. As expected, participants 
selected articles consistent with their prediction. Since the predictions were arbitrary and 
uninformed, the two options are said to be hedonically neutral, i.e. unmotivated. They further 
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argued that motivation for bias in this case was merely the desire to be correct in one’s 
prediction.   
Similarly, though perhaps more easily classified as motivated confirmation bias, is the 
phenomenon in which people seek to support and defend the beliefs and actions of their past 
selves (Hart et al., 2009). In doing this, people seek to view their past selves in a positive light 
and may even seek to avoid confronting the consequences of what would occur if they were 
wrong. This may take the form of selecting sources of information that support prior decisions 
such as taking one job over another or purchasing one house over another. More consequential 
are failures to confront information that contradicts prior decisions such as political decisions 
and civil actions (Bronfman et al., 2015; Lerman & Acland, 2020), wrongful convictions 
(Rossmo & Pollock, 2019), conclusions in strategic intelligence analysis (Whitesmith, 2019), 
and medical diagnoses (Elston, 2020).  
A Social Conception of Motivated Confirmation Bias 
 More recently, researchers in a variety of disciplines including social psychology and 
communications have studied motivated confirmation bias from a social perspective. Several 
studies have examined the effects of modern, individualized, news consumption and how news is 
shared within ideologically homogeneous groups (Athey et al., 2017; Duffy & Ling, 2020; Masta 
& Shearer, 2018; Törnberg, 2018), both of which can lead to confirmation bias (Garrett, 2017). 
Del Vicario et al. (2016, 2017) go further, finding that information consumers congregate into 
like-minded communities that nurture confirmation bias. In legacy forms of news delivery such 
as evening news broadcasts and physical newspapers, consumers were exposed to more 
heterogenous messages. Exposure to diverse perspectives has been shown to moderate bias 
(Guilbeault et al., 2018). Ling (2008, 2014) showed that news consumption via mobile 
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communication devices, such as smart phones, intensifies social cohesion and likely also 
exacerbates information silos. Ling (2020) argued that both cognitive and social conceptions 
should be combined in future studies of confirmation bias. Some researchers have taken this 
approach, using social network analysis and cognitive measures (Gašević et al., 2019; Houghton 
et al., 2015). However, as Ling (2020) notes, these studies can be methodologically difficult, not 
least because motivated confirmation bias is difficult to measure and control. Nevertheless, this 
is precisely the type of confirmation bias that has real world consequences.  
The Perils of Motivated Confirmation Bias 
Motivated confirmation bias has extensive public and private costs. For example, it 
affects the public understanding of science on a variety of polarized issues. These include 
vaccination (Meppelink et al., 2019), climate change (Druckman, 2015), gun control (Kahan, et 
al., 2017), and COVID-19 (Garcia-Alamino, 2020), among others. Since people can select and 
cultivate not only their own news sources, but also their own health and science information 
sources, their choices are easily influenced by confirmation bias. Worse, these choices can 
further entrench false beliefs. Knobloch-Westerwick et al. (2020) showed that people are 
selective about the news and information to which they expose themselves and tend toward that 
which agrees what they already believe. Meppelink et al. (2019) reached the same conclusion 
with regard to beliefs about vaccinations. In their study of nearly 500 parents of small children, 
parents indicated their beliefs about vaccination through an online survey and then selected from 
a reading list of 10 articles on vaccination. Unsurprisingly, people chose to read articles 
consistent with their beliefs. Participants also evaluated two preselected readings (one pro-
vaccination, one anti-vaccination) on three dimensions: credibility, usefulness, and 
convincingness. Unsurprisingly again, participants rated the reading that was consistent with 
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their beliefs higher on all three aspects. More worrisome, Meppelink et al. (2019) also measured 
participants’ health literacy using the Newest Vital Signs (NVS: Fransen et al., 2014), a 
validated health literacy measure, and found that the most health literate participants were also 
the most biased in their reading selections and perceptions.  
Research has demonstrated a number of factors that are correlated with biased 
information search and selective exposure across a variety of contexts including health literacy 
and others. These include dogmatism, authoritarianism, and anxiety (Hart et al., 2009), less 
positive affect, higher need for cognition, and greater cognitive reflection (Knobloch-Westerwick 
et al., 2020). Two of particular importance to the current study, problem solving skills and 
facility with numerical information, are discussed below.  
Problem Solving Skills Can Exacerbate Confirmation Bias 
Prior research has shown that even when individuals possess cognitive problem-solving 
skills, these skills may not offer any benefit to rational thinking or judgment in the face of 
motivated reasoning problem sets (Kahan et al., 2017; Meppelink et al., 2019). Kahan et al. 
(2017) demonstrated differences in rationality on a motivated confirmation bias detection task. In 
the task, participants interpreted a data table and indicated what conclusion it supported. In the 
control, i.e. unmotivated, condition, participants were told the data table was about the 
effectiveness of a rash treatment cream. In the treatment, i.e. motivated, condition, participants 
were told the data table was about the effectiveness of a ban on carrying concealed weapons to 
reduce crime. Apart from these instructions, the data tables, and hence the numerical tasks, were 
identical. Kahan demonstrated two major findings. First, numeracy, or facility with numerical 
information (an analog of literacy), was predictive of accuracy in the control condition, but not in 
the treatment condition. This finding suggests that the advantage in reasoning that numeracy 
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typically conveys is not operable in motivated reasoning scenarios. Second, in the treatment 
condition, accuracy was predicted by whether the data table a given participant interpreted was 
one that was congruous with that participant’s political beliefs. Thus, if the data table showed 
that the gun control measure reduced crime, liberals were more likely than conservatives to 
interpret the table correctly. Conversely, if the data table supported the conclusion that the gun 
control measure was ineffective, conservatives were more likely than liberals to interpret it 
correctly.  
Kahan et al. (2017) designed the experiment to evaluate two competing hypotheses: the 
science comprehension thesis (SCT) and the identity-protective cognition thesis (ICT). The SCT 
holds that people fail to understand scientific findings because they lack the intellectual ability to 
do so. The SCT would hold, for example, that many people reject the scientific evidence for 
climate change because climate science is complex and difficult to understand. The ICT, on the 
other hand, holds that most of the science presented to the public at large can be readily 
understood by its audience. Instead, the more determinative factor in whether an individual 
accepts or rejects scientific claims is whether those claims threaten one’s individual or group 
identity. The ICT would hold, for example, that many people reject the scientific evidence for 
climate change because they see those claims as threatening the truth of their cultural, religious, 
and/or political beliefs. ICT is a hypothesis about motivated confirmation bias; it holds that the 
public’s rejection of scientific claims is a defensive response to perceived threats. When 
confirmation bias is at work, individuals avoid such threatening information and instead seek out 
information that confirms their prior beliefs (Nickerson, 1998). 
Kahan’s findings supported the ICT hypothesis; while numeracy was predictive of 
accuracy in the control condition, with higher numeracy increasing the likelihood of a correct 
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response, the advantage conveyed by numeracy was not detectable in the treatment condition. 
Consistent with the ICT hypothesis, accuracy in the treatment condition was predicted by 
participants’ political identities (party affiliation and political philosophy) and whether the 
information participants were judging confirmed or contradicted their political outlook.  
The Neurobiology of Confirmation Bias 
Kappes et al. (2020) showed that people are differentially sensitive to the strength of 
others’ opinions, appropriately moderating their own views when others’ opinions confirm their 
own beliefs, but not so when others’ opinions contradict their own beliefs. While climate 
scientists’ belief in climate change has strengthened over time, for example, the percentage of the 
U.S. population that believes in climate change has simultaneously decreased (Funk & Kennedy, 
2016). Kappes et al. (2020) argued that this phenomenon is due to differences in the posterior 
medial prefrontal cortex, where neural sensitivity is reduced in the face of disconfirming 
opinions.  
In a neuroimaging study, Kaplan et al. (2016) presented 40 politically liberal participants 
with arguments that contradicted their political positions, as well as arguments that contradicted 
some non-political positions. When participants viewed political counterevidence, as compared 
to non-political counterevidence, neural activity was increased in the precuneus, posterior 
cingulate cortex, medial prefrontal cortex, inferior parietal lobe, and anterior temporal lobe. By 
contrast, when viewing arguments that countered their non-political beliefs, participants showed 
increased neural activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortices and orbitofrontal cortices. There 
were also differences between participants who more strongly resisted counterevidence and those 
who changed their minds. Belief perseverance was positively correlated with activity in the left 
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and negatively correlated with activity in the left orbitofrontal 
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cortex. Since participants rarely changed their political beliefs in the face of counterevidence, 
belief change was assessed using non-political arguments. Participants who changed their minds 
showed less neural activity in two areas: the dorsal anterior insular cortex, and the amygdala.  
Talluri et al. (2018) examined perceptual sensitivity in the selection and accumulation of 
post-choice information in a perceptual task. Participants viewed an initial dot-motion stimulus 
and stated the direction of motion they perceived. They then viewed a second dot-motion 
stimulus and indicated their perception of the overall direction of motion—their perception of the 
direction of motion across both stimuli. Participants were more sensitive to motion in the second 
stimulus when the direction of motion was consistent with their stated prior perception. This was 
true whether their prior perception was correct or incorrect. Modeling supported the hypothesis 
that rendering a choice after the first stimulus modulated weighting of sensory neurons so as to 
increase sensitivity to choice-consistent perceptions.  
Using a similar paradigm, Rollwage et al. (2020) demonstrated how a better 
understanding of the neurobiology of confirmation bias can inform interventions to overcome 
such bias. They examined the selection and accumulation of post-choice information in a 
perceptual task that involved identifying whether dots moving on a screen were indicative of 
motion to the left or right. Participants also indicated their level of confidence in their choice. 
Following exposure to additional evidence indicating the same direction of motion as the first 
exposure, participants gave a final determination of motion directionality. Participants who were 
wrong in their initial choice but highly confident were less likely to change their minds after 
viewing additional evidence than were participants who were wrong but less confident. measured 
Neural activity was measured using magnetoencephalography (MEG) to develop neural models. 
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Rollwage et al. concluded that high-confidence choice selection alters later neural processing of 
additional evidence that privileges choice-consistent data.  
The tasks used by Talluri et al. (2018) and Rollwage et al. (2020) were perceptual and 
thus not ones that would invoke a motivated reasoning bias. Thus, it is possible that the 
underlying neural mechanisms are at work in both simple, or unmotivated, confirmation bias, 
and more complex motivated confirmation bias. Moreover, since perception of one’s own 
confidence level is metacognitive—a perception of one’s own cognitions—and also an indicator 
of post-choice confirmation bias, Rollwage et al. suggest that metacognitive interventions may 
be effective in identifying and preventing confirmation bias.  
 Palminteri et al. (2017) showed that prediction error valence—whether positive or 
negative—has differential effects on learning. Participants were placed into two learning groups 
in which they answered multiple choice questions. Partial feedback consisting of indicating to 
participants whether their selected option was correct or incorrect was provided to one group. 
The second group was given complete feedback which indicated correctness or incorrectness for 
each possible answer choice. In factual learning, participants were more sensitive to, and learned 
more readily from, positive prediction errors. Thus, participants were more likely to remember 
the answer to a question if they thought they answered it incorrectly and were surprised by 
feedback that they were correct. In counterfactual learning, however, participants were more 
sensitive to negative prediction errors. In such cases they were more likely to remember an 
incorrect answer to a question as being incorrect if they did not choose that answer and were 
surprised by feedback stating they were correct in not choosing it. In either case, while the 
feedback type biased learning in different directions, participants still showed improved learning 
when their prior beliefs were confirmed.  
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 Prior research has also shown that dopaminergic genes in the dopamine reward system 
are predictive of individual differences in susceptibility to unmotivated confirmation bias (Doll 
et al., 2011). Specifically, the findings of Doll et al. support the conclusion that individual 
differences in dopaminergic genes play a causal role in individual cognitive differences—and 
these in turn play a causal role in individual behavioral differences.  
Doll et al. identified single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) predictive of individual 
differences in susceptibility to unmotivated confirmation bias. These SNPs are located in genes 
that affect dopamine regulation in the striatum (DARPP-32 & DRD2) and prefrontal processing 
efficiency (COMT). Striatal dopamine regulation is thought to affect confirmation bias because 
striatal dopamine is key to reward prediction error, the mechanism that likely goes awry in 
confirmation bias. While these findings implicate dopaminergic genes as a causal influence in 
unmotivated confirmation bias, the role of these genes in motivated confirmation bias has yet to 
be tested. 
Reward Prediction Error 
A reward prediction error (RPE) is a miscalculation of the likely result of an outcome. 
Rewards are best understood in their classical conditioning context; they strengthen the 
probability that a rewarded behavior will increase in frequency. Punishments, by contrast, 
weaken the probability that a punished behavior will increase in frequency. The reward 
prediction component of RPE is a prediction about the amount of reward that follows a behavior. 
This can occur in two ways. The reward can be greater than predicted (positive reward), or the 
reward can be less than predicted (negative reward). In some cases, the difference between the 
expected and actual reward is easy to measure. In a gambling task experiment, participants might 
win a variable number of marshmallows when they select a winning card. The RPE, in this case, 
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could be measured as the difference between the number of marshmallows expected and the 
number received. In other cases, predicted reward and actual reward are more difficult to 
measure. This is the case when the predicted and actual reward are amounts of dopamine 
released by dopaminergic neurons, or the felt effects of dopamine modulation. If the release of 
dopamine as a reward is perceived as pleasure or another positive affective state, then RPE might 
be perceived as a feeling of more or less pleasure than expected. This is how RPEs can be 
rewarding, encouraging the repetition of a behavior, or punishments, discouraging the repetition 
of a behavior. The former occurs when the error is an underestimation of the reward (reward is 
more than expected); the latter occurs when the error is an overestimation of the reward (reward 
is less than expected).  
 RPEs are encoded by dopaminergic neurons; however, dopaminergic neurons do much 
more than RPE. The various roles these neurons play can be distinguished by timescale. The 
signaling associated with RPE is phasic, occurs approximately 100 ms after stimulus onset, and 
has a latency period of approximately 150 ms (Schultz, 2017). Other dopamine functions, 
including reward more broadly, occur over seconds and longer. In addition to these phasic 
activities, dopaminergic neurons also play an essential role in maintaining homeostatic dopamine 
levels through tonic dopamine release. This tonic activity is what is disrupted in Parkinson’s 
disease (Schultz, 2017).  
Dopaminergic neurons that encode RPE do so by encoding estimated value—typically 
the averaged value of recent past rewards that followed a specific action (Bayer & Glimcher, 
2005). The averaged value is also the expected value, and any prediction error is the difference 
between the expected average and actual reward. If there is an RPE, the information from the 
error is used to update a new average for reward prediction. In this way, learning about expected 
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rewards is encoded. This simple model cannot account for all learning, however, especially 
learning complex tasks. Consider a game in which a subject is rewarded with a marshmallow 
after eating a chocolate, and rewarded with a chocolate after eating a marshmallow, but not 
rewarded if the subject ever eats two chocolates in a row or two marshmallows in a row. The 
optimal strategy is to switch back and forth between the rewards; however, dopaminergic 
encoding of RPE can likely only explain an approach or avoidance behavior for each reward, and 
not a more complex switching strategy (Bayer & Glimcher, 2005). This is because the RPE gives 
feedback after single actions and not series of actions. It will always signal an approach or avoid 
response after each action. Combining series of actions requires more complex, higher-order, 
learning mechanism (Bayer & Glimcher, 2005). Thus, RPEs are optimal for predicting binary 
(approach, avoid) and immediate probabilistic outcomes.  
That dopaminergic neurons play a role in encoding a predicted value, also called a utility 
value, was worked out theoretically through neurocomputational modeling (Bayer & Glimcher, 
2005). This theoretical approach was followed by neurophysiological experiments to test a series 
of theoretical models. Bayer and Glimcher (2005) found support for the encoding of utility 
values in reward prediction models through neurophysiological experiments with midbrain 
dopaminergic neurons. Interestingly, the behavior of these neurons could only account for one 
type of RPE; namely, the RPE that occurs when a reward is greater than expected (positive 
RPE). In other words, they did not account for RPEs that occur when a reward is less than 
expected. Thus, the firing pattern of these neurons that encodes the difference between predicted 
and actual rewards is only observed when actual rewards are greater than expected. The authors 
speculated that the encoding of negative RPEs may be accomplished by another system.  
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More specifically, Bayer and Glimcher (2005) found a correlation between the spike 
frequency of dopamine neurons and a calculated RPE function that considers the average of the 
last seven rewards. In their experiment, these rewards were varying amounts of juice given to 
primates. The trials occurred back-to-back over the course of several minutes. The primates were 
trained in a delayed saccade task and had to work out what amount of time post-stimulus would 
achieve a maximum reward. The behavior of these neurons in response to negative RPEs was 
quite distinct. They rectified—which is to say, their activity followed a ramp function—the 
importance of which is that their activity was not sensitive to, and did not differentially encode, 
the exact difference between varying averaged rewards and predicted rewards (Bayer & 
Glimcher, 2005). Instead, this activity was distinctive of all negative RPEs.  
Further evidence that positive and negative RPEs are encoded by different mechanisms 
comes from human neuroimaging studies in which these processes have been shown to be 
correlated with activity in different brain areas. A meta-analysis of thirty-five fMRI studies of 
human subjects by Garrison et al. (2013) found activity in the midbrain and ventral striatum 
correlated with positive RPE. Negative or aversive RPEs were found to correlate with increased 
activity in a more confined area of the left ventral striatum (Garrison et al., 2013). This, of 
course, does not imply that the mechanisms for encoding these distinct RPEs are different; it is 
possible that the mechanisms are the same but carried out by redundant systems in different 
locations. Thus, dopaminergic neurons in the confined portion of the left ventral striatum may 
still distinguish between different negative reward prediction areas by spike frequency.  
Nevertheless, such compartmentalization appears to be part of an integrated hierarchy of 
processing structures. Both positive and negative RPEs are correlated with activation of the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Garrison et al., 2013), a known point of integration for a variety 
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of processes from distinct neural substrates. Within the ACC, specific regions show activity that 
correlates with only positive, only negative, and both positive and negative RPEs. Positive RPEs, 
for example, showed activation in the pregenual ACC, while both positive and negative RPEs 
showed activation in the anteromedial ACC. This may be evidence that distinct systems for 
positive and negative RPEs have inputs into distinct regions of the ACC and the information 
from these inputs is combined in yet another region of the ACC.  
Since RPEs help us to refine our expectations of the environment’s response to our 
behaviors, they are tremendously important in reward-based learning. Unsurprisingly, learning is 
easily disrupted when the systems responsible for recalculating these expectations are disrupted 
(Murray et al., 2008). 
SNPs Associated with Susceptibility to Confirmation Bias 
The SNPs examined by Doll et al. were in genes that code for the DARPP-32 protein, the 
COMT enzyme, and D2 dopamine receptors, all elements involved in dopamine regulation. The 
polymorphisms, shown to be predictive of individual differences in susceptibility to confirmation 
bias, likely have their effects on cognition and behavior via RPE calculations in the striatum and, 
in the case of COMT, possibly PFC dopamine regulation at neurons with striatal projections. 
DRD2 
 Dopamine receptor D2 (DRD2) is the gene that codes for the D2 dopamine receptor 
subtype principally expressed in the striatum (Camps et al., 1989). The DRD2 SNP of interest is 
C957T (rs6277). Although a synonymous mutation, the resulting mRNA occurs in different 
conformations for 957C and 957T. 957T mRNA is degraded at a higher rate than 957C mRNA.  
The result is that T alleles produce less D2 receptors (Hirvonen et al., 2004, 2005, 2009). 
Behaviorally, because there is less D2 affinity, T allele carriers are less sensitive to RPEs in 
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which dopamine drops below baseline. Their takeaway from negative RPEs is avoidance rather 
than reward recalculation. 
Doll et al. (2011) showed that participants with the T allele at C957T were less accurate 
than C/C homozygotes when given incorrect instructions in a probabilistic card task. This finding 
is supported by other work showing that T alleles are part of a mechanism responsible for under-
learning from punishment (negative RPEs), i.e., diminished learning of information inconsistent 
with prior beliefs. This occurs because confronting information that challenges one’s beliefs 
causes dopamine levels to drop below baseline, and D2 receptors are essential for detecting this 
drop (Doll et al., 2011). In such an occurrence, one experiences a negative RPE; however, one 
fails to learn from it and recalibrate future reward predictions. Additionally, Frank (2005), 
Hikida et al. (2010), and Shen et al. (2008) have demonstrated that instead of recalibrating to 
better predict future outcomes, individuals with T alleles at C957T show improvements in 
avoidance learning. Thus, in the face of RPEs, learning still takes place in these individuals; 
however, what is learned is not a recalibration of probabilistic outcomes that maps onto the 
world. Rather, it is an avoidance of stimuli that produce the negative feelings caused by the drop 
in dopamine levels produced by negative RPEs (punishments).  
DRD2 variants have been examined in connection with a variety of cognitive functions. 
Zhang and Zhang (2016) showed associations between multiple SNPs in DRD2 and individual 
differences in performance at insight problem solving. A number of recent studies have also 
demonstrated support for a link between DRD2 variants, including at C957T, and neurological 
and psychiatric disease (Nkam et al., 2017). C957T variants are associated with both 
schizophrenia and cognitive and neurological deficits accompanying schizophrenia (Zai et al., 
2017), such as diminished working memory capacity (Schwarz et al., 2016) and inhibitory 
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control (Liu et al., 2014). For this reason, it was theorized that C957T polymorphisms may play 
a contributory causal role in schizophrenia; however, a metanalysis of 17 independent studies 
recently found no link between C957T and the cognitive components of executive function: 
working memory, response inhibition, and cognitive flexibility (Klaus et al., 2019). Even among 
healthy adults, however, differences in reward learning performance among T/T homozygotes at 
DRD2 C957T, and C allele carriers have been observed (Byrne et al., 2016).  
DARPP-32 
 The DARPP-32 polymorphism of interest, though synonymous, results in different 
transcription rates for the DARPP-32 protein leading to more or less available synaptic dopamine 
(Scheggi et al., 2018). The SNP has been widely studied and its two alleles differentially 
associated with schizophrenia and biopolar disorder (Yoshimi et al., 2008), suicide (Feldcamp et 
al., 2008), amygdala volume and anger (Reuter et al., 2009), and neurological connectivity in 
associative emotional learning (Ćurčić-Blake et al., 2012) among others. DARPP-32 is an 
intracellular protein encoded in the PPP1R1B gene that has been shown to affect reward 
learning. When presynaptic dopamine crosses the synapse and stimulates postsynaptic D1 
dopamine receptors, phosphoryl groups in the postsynaptic cell attach to DARPP-32 proteins at 
two sites, Thr-34 and Thr-75. DARPP-32 is then dephosphorylated by D2 receptor stimulation. 
Such protein phosphorylation is a pervasive and essential means of functional regulation; it 
enables signal transduction that is both fast and reversable, enabling the phasic bursts typical of 
the dopamine reward system’s RPEs, and thereby strengthening synaptic plasticity, and by 
extension, reward learning (Stipanovich et al., 2008; Svenningsson et al., 2004). Here, 
phosphorylation also inhibits protein phosphatase-1 (PP-1) from attaching at these sites and 
reducing the strength of synaptic connections (Munton et al., 2004). Frank et al. (2007, 2009) 
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found that T alleles at rs907094 are positively correlated with increased learning from positive 
RPEs. This may occur because T alleles at this SNP are part of a haplotype that is associated 
with greater DARPP-32 expression (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2007). Similarly, Doll et al. 
(2011) found that while T alleles at rs907094 promote learning from positive RPEs, they are 
negatively correlated with learning from negative RPEs.  
 In contrast to findings from Doll et al. (2011), a study by Collins and Frank (2012) found 
no relationship between DARPP-32 polymorphisms and reinforcement learning. Byrne et al. 
(2016) hypothesized that this difference may be due to differences in cognitive processing 
associated with differences in the two study designs. Doll et al. (2011) used a probability 
selection task in which participants learned and categorized novel symbols. Collins and Frank 
(2012) used known categories and category members in their task. Byrne et al. (2016) reasoned 
that the DARPP-32 polymorphisms may play distinct rolls in these two types of learning and 
categorization.  
 DARPP-32 also modulates striatal plasticity with different effects on reward learning 
(Doll et al., 2015). DARPP-32 polymorphisms are also associated with individual differences in 
working memory, prefrontal activity, and differences in model-based and model-free learning 
(Deserno et al., 2015). A recent study demonstrated that DARPP-32 T alleles in the striatum 
increased model-free learning over C alleles; however, C alleles were predictive of better 
performance in model-based learning (Doll et al., 2016).  
COMT 
 Catechol-o-methyltransferase (COMT) is an enzyme that degrades catecholamines 
including extracellular dopamine. The COMT gene codes for the enzyme; however, a 
nonsynonymous polymorphism, Val158Met (rs4680), has been shown to contribute to individual 
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differences in dopamine regulation (Gogos et al., 1998; Huotari et al., 2002; Matsumoto et al., 
2003). Val158Met is the most studied of the SNPs examined here. Its alleles are differentially 
associated with focus during working memory tasks (Heinz & Smolka, 2006), emotional 
resilience (Smloka et al., 2005), and a variety of findings related to risks of schizophrenia, 
ADHD, and substance abuse, among others. Differences at this SNP are associated with different 
basal dopamine levels and, by extension, the availability of D1 receptors in the prefrontal cortex 
(PFC) (Slifstein et al., 2008). The Met version of COMT operates less efficiently in breaking 
down synaptic dopamine such that Met carriers have four times as much available dopamine as 
Val carriers. This leaves more synaptic dopamine available to activate postsynaptic neurons in 
the PFC. The result is sustained PFC activation and improved executive functioning, working 
memory for abstract rules (Durstewitz et al., 2010; Durstewitz & Seamans, 2008) and high-order 
cognitive faculties in reward learning (Frank et al., 2007, 2009).  
 Unlike the SNPs in DRD2 and DARPP-32, the Val158Met SNP in the COMT gene does 
not have significant effects on striatal dopamine (Gogos et al., 1998); however, there is evidence 
that the effects of COMT in the PFC play a role in striatal dopamine regulation through neuronal 
projections from the PFC to the striatum (Krugel et al., 2009). 
 Doll et al. (2011) found that Met allele carriers were more susceptible to unmotivated 
confirmation bias. In a probabilistic card selection task in which participants were given 
incorrect instructions about which cards were most likely to be winners, Met allele carriers 
continued to play according to the incorrect probabilities in the instructions and did not switch 
strategies based on the observed outcomes in the task trials. Doll et al. reasoned that this 
susceptibility to confirmation bias was the downside of the improved working memory 
associated with Met carriers. While improved working memory might allow these participants to 
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keep instructions in mind throughout multiple trials with feedback, it is unclear why improved 
working memory could only hold those instructions in mind, and not the feedback from the trials 
themselves. Thus, Doll et al.’s finding regarding COMT and confirmation bias may require 
additional or alternative explanation.  
 Like DARPP-32, COMT polymorphisms also play differential roles in model-based and 
model-free learning. Doll et al. (2016) showed that prefrontal Met alleles predicted better 
performance on a model-based learning task than Val alleles, such that Met allele carriers 
outperformed Val/Val homozygotes. They reasoned that Met alleles amplified model-based 
choice performance by augmenting working memory, a cognitive process which occurs in the 
prefrontal cortex and is dopamine dependent (Otto et al., 2013). 
 Despite numerous studies showing an effect of COMT polymorphisms on cognitive 
abilities, a meta-analysis of 58 studies recently found no such effect (Geller et al., 2017) and 
concluded the effect was either too small to detect or was not there at all. The study differed 
from a 2008 meta-analysis (Barnett et al.) in that Geller et al. only included studies of healthy 
adults; however, both studies failed to find the much-discussed association between Val158Met 
polymorphisms and individual differences in cognitive function.  
 Apart from cognitive functions as traditionally conceived, the COMT Val158Met 
polymorphism has been implicated in emotional decision-making, a relationship that de Souza 
Costa et al. (2016) showed to be mediated by sex. Using the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), de 
Souza Costa et al. showed Val/Val homozygotes performed better in the latter half of 100 
selections in the task only when those Val/Val genotypes belonged to women. Learning in the 
IGT typically shows up in later trials because most learning takes place in early trials. Decision-
making in later trials is considered emotional decision-making because the task is probabilistic 
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and the decisions are therefore risky. By contrast, early trials which take place prior to or during 
early learning are considered to be ambiguous. De Souza Costa et al. reasoned that the sex 
differences may be due to an increased focus on a long-game payoff in men, and an increased 
sensitivity to individual losses in women. Regardless of sex, Met alleles at Val158Met have been 
associated with a negativity bias such that resistance to negative emotional states is reduced (Gao 
et al., 2016). These Met alleles are also associated with anxiety disorders (McGrath et al., 2004) 
and depression (Åberg et al., 2011).   
 The Val158Met polymorphism is also predictive of individual differences in 
susceptibility to framing effect biases (Quinn et al., 2019). Specifically, Val carriers were more 
susceptible to framing effects. Participants answered questions in one frame, then answered the 
same questions differently framed. Val carriers were more likely to change their responses to the 
questions when they were reframed. The authors hypothesized that the Met allele, and its 
accompanying increased dopamine in prefrontal synapses, may enhance consistent choice 
selection.  
Current Study 
 In order to discover whether the dopaminergic genes predictive of unmotivated 
confirmation bias are also predictive of motivated confirmation bias, we used the motivated 
confirmation bias detection task developed by Kahan et al. (2017) and its unmotivated control 
task in conjunction with genotyping the relevant SNPs in DRD2, DARPP-32, and COMT genes. 
This approach allowed us to rely on a peer-reviewed paradigm for detecting motivated 
confirmation bias established in a sample of 1111 participants. In doing so, we sought to 
replicate Kahan’s findings as well as to replicate and extend the findings of Doll et al. by 
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evaluating whether motivated bias is associated with the same genes found to be predictive of 
unmotivated confirmation bias.  
Hypotheses 
Given that RPE underlies motivated confirmation bias, we hypothesized that the same 
SNPs identified by Doll et al. (2017), DRD2 (rs6277), DARPP-32 (rs907094), and COMT 
(rs4680), as predictive of individual differences in susceptibility to unmotivated confirmation 
bias would also be predictive of individual differences in susceptibility to motivated 
confirmation bias. It was further hypothesized that political identity would predict bias; 
specifically, that in the treatment condition, participants whose stimuli affirmed their political 
beliefs would be more accurate, and those whose stimuli contradicted their political beliefs 
would be less accurate. Political ideology was not expected to have any effect on accuracy in the 
control (unmotivated) condition. Finally, it was hypothesized that in the control condition, 
numeracy and accuracy would show a strong, positive, correlation, such that increased numeracy 
would be associated with improved accuracy. In the treatment condition, however, it was 
expected that this relationship would not hold. Rather, it was hypothesized that Kahan’s findings 
would be replicated and motivated confirmation bias would wipe out any advantage in accuracy 
that numeracy would otherwise convey. 
It is possible that genotype might interact with numeracy to influence cognitive 
performance, such as susceptibility to bias. The dopaminergic genes examined here have been 
associated with various cognitive processes and traits in multiple studies. These include 
executive functioning such as working memory, response inhibition, and cognitive flexibility, 
emotional decision-making, and framing-effects-induced bias, among others. However, it is also 
the case that several of these purported links between the genetic polymorphisms under 
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examination here, and various cognitive properties, have not shown an effect in meta-analyses. 
Therefore, while we conducted analyses to detect any such interactions, we did not form a 
hypothesis regarding them. Similarly, Doll et al. (2015) found that COMT polymorphisms at 
C957T had differential effects on model-based and model-free learning.   
Methods 
 
Participants and Procedure 
 
Participants were 200 university students, 128 males and 72 females, mean age = 18.97, 
who participated in this experiment for class credit. The study protocol was approved by the 
University of Oklahoma Institutional Review Board and Institutional Biosafety Committee. All 
participants completed informed consent and HIPAA forms before beginning the experiment. 
Following randomization to study groups, the participants completed the primary experimental 
task and other study measures. Participants were randomly assigned to either the control (n = 96) 
or experimental (n = 104) group which were distinguished according to the version of the 
primary experimental task that was administered. All study questionnaires were delivered in-
person via computer. 
The primary experimental task was a motivated bias detection task (MBDT) developed 
by Kahan et al. (2017). The MBDT is a data interpretation task designed to elicit and detect 
motivated confirmation bias in the treatment condition when compared to the control condition. 
Control group participants were asked to interpret a data table to determine the effectiveness of a 
hand cream to treat a skin rash while the experimental group participants were asked to interpret 
a data table indicating the effectiveness of a concealed-carry weapons ban at reducing crime. 
Each study group was further randomly subdivided into whether the data table presented in the 
scenario was in support of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the skin cream/weapons ban. 
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The resulting four scenarios are presented in Figures 1-4. Each participant responded to only one 
scenario. As shown in the figures, the numerical data and their positions in the table were 
unchanged across the scenarios but the column labels differed. When properly interpreted on the 
basis of the data alone, the varying positions of these labels should result in a single “correct” 
judgment to be made with regard to effectiveness. Accuracy of the resulting decision of the 
participant served as the primary dependent variable for all analyses.  
After completion of this task, participants completed a nine-question numeracy scale and 
a demographics questionnaire. The numeracy scale combined questions from separate validated 
numeracy scales such as Weller et al.’s (2012) scale and the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) 
(Liberali et al., 2012) and was originally combined and used by Kahan et al. (2017). The same 
scale was used here to replicate Kahan’s findings. Like other numeracy scales, Kahan’s 
combined scale measures participants’ facility with quantitative data and their ability to apply it 
to solve practical problems. Use of this measure allows for analyses exploring whether numeracy 
confers any benefit when motivated reasoning is at play. Each question in the numeracy scale 
was marked correct or incorrect and participants were scored from 0-9 based on their number of 
correct answers.  
The demographics questionnaire included two questions about political identity. The first 
was a 7-point party identity Likert scale ranging from strong democrat to strong republican. The 
second was a 5-point political ideology Likert scale ranging from very liberal to very 
conservative. These scales were also used in Kahan et al. (2017) and were used here to replicate 
those findings. The purpose of capturing political ideology is to assess differences in accuracy on 
the MBDT when considering alignment between participants’ political outlook and their 
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randomly assigned table. Kahan found, for example, that data tables were more likely to be 
interpreted correctly when they confirmed participants’ prior political beliefs.  
At the conclusion of the computer-based surveys, participants provided saliva samples for 
DNA analysis. Each participant used one Oragene®•Discover OGR-600 from DNA Genotek. 
Participants indicated the last time they had any food or drink. They then waited at least 30 
minutes from that time before providing a saliva sample. They then washed their hands with soap 
and water and put on disposable gloves. Once gloved, participants took their saliva collection 
kits and spit into the funnel until they produced enough saliva to reach the fill line. Once 
complete, participants handed their samples to the experimenter. The experimenter verified the 
amount of saliva was sufficient, replaced the tube funnel with a tube cap, shook the capped tube 
for five seconds, and verified and wrote the participant number on the tube. After handing over 
their saliva samples, participants disposed of their gloves and washed their hands again with soap 
and water before departing the lab.  
Molecular Biology 
Reagents 
The prepIT®•L2P (PT-L2P), TaqPathTM ProAmpTM Master Mix and all other reagents were 
purchased from Thermo Fisher Scientific (Waltham, MA). 
Nucleic Acid Extraction 
DNA extraction from the saliva samples was conducted in a Biosafety Level II (BSL2) 
lab at Oklahoma Medical Research Foundation (OMRF). The extraction protocol used was DNA 
Genotek “Laboratory protocol for manual purification of DNA from 0.5 mL of sample.” Saliva 
samples were mixed by inversion and gentle shaking for 10 seconds and then incubated in a 
50C water bath for one hour. After incubation, collection tubes were wiped clean and 500 L of 
 35  
each sample was placed into a separate 1.5 mL microcentrifuge tube. Twenty L of 
prepIT®•L2P (PT-L2P) reagent was added to each microcentrifuge tube. The combined solution 
was then vortexed for five seconds. The microcentrifuge tubes were next incubated on ice for 10 
minutes and then centrifuged at room temperature for five minutes at 15,000 x g. 500 L of 
supernatant from each tube was then transferred into separate microcentrifuge tubes and the 
pellets were discarded. 600 L of room temperature 100% ethanol was added and gently mixed 
by 10 inversions. After sitting at room temperature for 10 minutes, samples were centrifuged 
again for two minutes at 15,000 x g. The supernatant was removed and discarded. The DNA 
pellet was then washed with 250 L of 70% ethanol. After one minute, the ethanol was removed 
and discarded. 100 L of TE solution was added to dissolve the DNA pellet and the tubes were 
vortexed for 5 seconds. Samples incubated overnight at room temperature and were then stored 
at 4C until testing.  
Real-Time PCR for DNA Genotyping 
DNA genotyping was conducted at the University of Oklahoma’s Biology Core 
Molecular Laboratory. Each sample was tested to determine its genotype for three SNPs: DRD2 
gene polymorphism (rs6277), DARPP-32 gene polymorphism (rs907094), and COMT gene 
polymorphism (rs4680). DNA concentration was established via Qubit fluorometer 2.0 (Thermo 
Fisher Scientific).  
Samples were tested using TaqManTM SNP Genotyping Assays for each of the three 
genes and used TaqPathTM ProAmpTM Master Mix (Catalog no.: A30865; Thermo Fisher 
Scientific). DRD2 (rs6277) genotypes were tested using TaqMan SNP Assay (Identification no.: 
C_11339240_10; Thermo Fisher Scientific). The assay contained two minor groove binding 
fluorescent probes, a VICTM-labeled probe, which detected the C allele at C957T, and a FAMTM-
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labeled probe, which detected the T allele. For each 96-well 10 L Fast reaction, 5 L TaqMan® 
Master Mix and 0.5 L assay working stock were premixed via vortex and briefly centrifuged. 
Purified DNA samples were diluted with nuclease-free water and added to the plate wells. Two 
wells in each plate served as no-call controls. The remaining wells filled with 4.5 L diluted 
DNA sample and 5.5 L assay reaction mix. An adhesive film was added to the plate and the 
plate was briefly centrifuged.  
DARPP-32 (rs907094) genotypes were tested using TaqMan SP Assay MTO Human SM 
(Identification no.: C_7452370_1; Thermo Fisher Scientific). The assay contained two minor 
groove binding fluorescent probes, a VICTM-labeled probe, which detected the C allele and a 
FAMTM-labeled probe, which detected the T allele. Assay reaction mix, diluted DNA, and plate 
preparation followed the same procedure as that for DRD2 above.  
COMT (rs4680) genotypes were tested using TaqMan Drug Metabolism Assay 
(Identification no.: C_25746809_50); Thermo Fisher Scientific). The assay contained two minor 
groove binding fluorescent probes, a VICTM-labeled probe, which detected the Val allele, and a 
FAMTM-labeled probe, which detected the Met allele.  Assay reaction mix, diluted DNA, and 
plate preparation followed the same procedure as that for DRD2 above.  
Samples were amplified on a BioRad CFX96 TouchTM Real-Time PCR Detection 
System. A pre-PCR plate read was first run to identify background fluorescence. This 
background reading was subtracted from the PCR runs that followed. For DRD2 and DARPP-32 
amplification, samples were heated to 95C for 10 minutes to activate polymerases, then 
followed 40 cycles of denaturation at 95C for 15 seconds and annealing at 60C for 1 minute. 
For COMT amplification, samples were heated to 95C for 10 minutes to activate polymerases, 
then underwent 50 cycles of denaturation at 95C for 15 seconds and annealing at 60C for 90 
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seconds. Failed reactions were repeated. Genotypes for all samples were determined. Quality 
control for the genotype calls was established using negative controls to show a zero point for 
comparison. Samples were also run twice, as a positive control, to ensure each run produced the 
same results.  
Data Analysis 
 
Chi-square and independent samples t-tests were used to compare demographic 
characteristics between study groups. Chi-square tests were also used to compare allele 
frequencies between treatment and control groups. Binary logistic regression analysis was 
conducted to examine the effects of genotype, group assignment (treatment or control), and table 
assignment (effective or ineffective) on the accuracy of judgments made in data table 
interpretation. Additional logistic regression analyses were conducted to examine secondary 
aims related to numeracy and political identity. Data analyses were generated using SPSS 
software, Version 24 of IBM SPSS Statistics for Mac (IBM Corporation., Armonk, NY, USA). 





Of the 96 participants in the control group, 55 (57.3%) received the data table which 
when correctly interpreted indicated effectiveness of the skin cream and 41 (42.7%) 
ineffectiveness. Similarly, in the experimental group, approximately half of the 104 participants, 
47 (45.2%) interpreted a table indicating the gun-control measure was effective and 57 (54.8%) 
ineffective.  
Differences between study groups are presented in Table 1. As shown, there were no 
significant differences observed between treatment and control groups in age (p = 0.19) or 
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gender (p = 0.53). Further, no differences were observed in the frequency of party identity (p = 
0.42), political philosophy (p = 0.12), or numeracy score (p = 0.32).  
Overall allele frequencies are presented in Table 2. The distribution of DRD2 genotypes 
was significantly different between treatment and control groups (p < 0.02) due to the higher 
presence of homozygous T/T genotypes in the treatment group (37:17). There were no 
significant differences in the group distributions of DARPP-32 or COMT genotypes (p > 0.05).  
Allele frequencies for all three genes were within Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. The 
calculated Chi-squared values for differences between observed and expected allele frequencies 
for each gene were as follows: DRD2 2 = .718, p > 0.05; DARPP-32 2 = 2.855, p > 0.05; 
COMT 2 = 0.064, p > 0.05.  
We also examined group differences for a binary reclassification of the alleles according 
to the presence or absence of a particular allele. For DRD2, groups were created according to 
presence of the T allele, for DARPP-32 the C allele, and for COMT the Met allele. As an 
example, for DRD2 the two groups consisted of 1) the non-T (i.e., C/C) homozygous group and 
2) a combination of the T/T homozygous group and the heterozygous (C/T) group. No 
differences were observed in the binary allele frequency between treatment and control groups 
for any of the three genes (all p > 0.05; Table 3).  
MBDT Performance Predictors 
Only 63/200 (31.5%) participants interpreted the data tables correctly. Participants in the 
control (i.e., unmotivated) condition were significantly more likely (2 = 23.059, p < .001) to 
answer the primary task question correctly (n = 46, 48%) than participants in the treatment group 
(n = 17, 27%).  
Primary Analyses 
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 A 3-predictor logistic regression model was used to test differential effects on the 
accuracy of MDMT task performance of DRD2 genotype, group assignment (treatment or 
control), and table assignment (effective or ineffective). None of the two- or three-way 
interactions were significant, thus the model was reduced to the main effects model.  
 This 3-predictor model successfully predicted accuracy as indicated by a significant 
overall likelihood ratio, χ2(4) = 25.7, p < .001, R2 = 12.1%, Nagelkerke’s R2 = 16.9%. However, 
as shown in Table 4, only group assignment successfully predicted the odds of accurately 
interpreting the MBDT data table. Consistent with the basic group comparisons presented above, 
treatment group participants were significantly less likely (OR = .196, 95% CI: .098-.389) to 
answer correctly (p < .001). Neither DRD2 genotype nor table assignment significantly altered 
the odds of MBDT accuracy (ps > 0.05; Table 4). This analysis was replicated using the binary 
reclassification of DRD2 according to presence of the T allele. Results were unchanged and 
again only identified a significant effect of group (Table 5).  
A second 3-predictor logistic regression model was used to test differential effects on the 
accuracy of MDMT task performance of DARPP-32 genotype, group assignment (treatment or 
control), and table assignment (effective or ineffective). None of the two- or three-way 
interactions were significant, thus the model was reduced to the main effects model.  
This 3-predictor model successfully predicted accuracy as indicated by a significant 
overall likelihood ratio, χ2(4) = 24.5, p < .001, R2 = 11.5%, Nagelkerke’s R2 = 16.2%. However, 
as shown in Table 4, only group assignment successfully predicted the odds of accurately 
interpreting the MBDT data table. Consistent with the basic group comparisons presented above, 
treatment group participants were significantly less likely (OR = .216, 95% CI: .111-.420) to 
answer correctly (p < .001). Neither DARPP-32 genotype nor table assignment significantly 
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altered the odds of MBDT accuracy (ps > 0.05; Table 4). This analysis was replicated using the 
binary reclassification of DARPP-32 according to presence of the C allele. Results were 
unchanged and again only identified a significant effect of group (Table 5).  
Finally, a third 3-predictor logistic regression model was used to test differential effects 
on the accuracy of MDMT task performance of COMT genotype, group assignment (treatment 
or control), and table assignment (effective or ineffective). None of the two- or three-way 
interactions were significant, thus the model was reduced to the main effects model.  
This 3-predictor model successfully predicted accuracy as indicated by a significant 
overall likelihood ratio, χ2(4) = 25.5, p < .001, R2 = 12.0%, Nagelkerke’s R2 = 16.8%. However, 
as shown in Table 4, only group assignment successfully predicted the odds of accurately 
interpreting the MBDT data table. Consistent with the basic group comparisons presented above, 
treatment group participants were significantly less likely (OR = .211, 95% CI: .108-.411) to 
answer correctly (p < .001). Neither COMT genotype nor table assignment significantly altered 
the odds of MBDT accuracy (ps > 0.05; Table 4). This analysis was replicated using the binary 
reclassification of COMT according to presence of the Met allele. Results were unchanged and 
again only identified a significant effect of group (Table 5).  
Post-hoc power analyses were conducted for each of these three main effects models and 
showed that the analyses were underpowered for the observed effect sizes.  
Secondary Analyses 
Having found that none of the three SNPs in the dopaminergic genes of interest were 
predictive of accuracy on the MBDT, we examined whether numeracy, political philosophy, or 
political party affiliation were predictive of accuracy. Since primary analyses indicated a group 
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effect (treatment or control) on the odds of accurate response, each of the secondary analysis 
predictor variables were examined separately in models that controlled for group assignment. 
Numeracy 
 
 We next investigated the possibility of interactions between numeracy and genotype in 
order to discover if perhaps numeracy differentially acted on genotype to influence behavior. To 
do so, we created three two-way interaction terms representing the interaction of numeracy with 
each of the three genotypes and examined each in separate analyses. In these analyses, each 
genotype included three possibilities: two homozygote and one heterozygote. Since the 
behavioral effects detected by Doll et al. (2011) showed up when isolating certain alleles, we 
also conducted analyses recoding genotype factor in the interaction into just two options (for 
example, presence of C allele vs. T/T homozygote).  None of these six analyses showed any 
significance for genotype. Finally, we included sex as a covariate. When we did so, no 
significant effect was found; however, the significant effect of numeracy that was previously 
found was lessened. A significant effect for sex can be shown by eliminating numeracy from the 
analysis; however, numeracy must be included as it accounts for more of the variability in 
performance than does sex.  
Having found no significant interaction terms, these were dropped from the model in 
order to reduce complexity and increase power. A 2-predictor logistic regression model was used 
to test differential effects on the accuracy of MDMT task performance of numeracy (scored 0-9) 
and group assignment. The resulting model successfully predicted accuracy as indicated by a 
significant overall likelihood ratio, χ2(2) = 38.1, p < .001, R2 = 17.3%, Nagelkerke’s R2 = 24.3%. 
Specifically, after controlling for group assignment, numeracy significantly altered the odds of 
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MBDT accuracy (p = .009); for every point increase in numeracy score, the odds of accurately 
interpreting the table increase by 38%.    
Party Identity 
 
 A 2-predictor logistic regression model was also used to test the differential effects on the 
accuracy of MDMT task performance of party identity and group assignment. Political identity 
was assessed on a 7-point Likert scale from Strong Democrat to Strong Republican. No group x 
party identity interaction was indicated. The resulting model successfully predicted accuracy as 
indicated by a significant overall likelihood ratio, χ2(7) = 29.0, p < .001, R2 = 13.5%, 
Nagelkerke’s R2 = 18.9%. However, after controlling for group assignment, party identity did not 
significantly alter the odds of MBDT accuracy (p = .533).  
Political Philosophy 
Logistic regression was also used to model the differential effects of political philosophy 
and group assignment on the accuracy of MDMT task performance. Political philosophy was 
assessed on a 5-point Likert scale from Very Liberal to Very Conservative. No group x political 
philosophy interaction was indicated. As with party identity, the resulting model successfully 
predicted accuracy, χ2(5) = 29.9, p < .001, R2 = 13.9%, Nagelkerke’s R2 = 19.5%. However, after 
controlling for group assignment, political identity did not significantly alter the odds of MBDT 
accuracy (p = .191). 
Discussion 
 
Confirmation bias takes two cognitively and behaviorally distinct forms: motivated and 
unmotivated. Seminal work by Doll et al. (2011) and Kahan et al. (2017) showed that the 
influence of motivated confirmation bias is so strong as to erode the benefit of numeric 
competency in rational thought, and that SNPs important to dopamine regulation predict 
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susceptibility to unmotivated confirmation bias, respectively. In order to assess whether these 
cognitively and behaviorally separable phenomena are neurobiologically distinct, we sought to 
replicate Kahan’s findings on motivated confirmation bias while also testing for effects from the 
dopaminergic SNPs identified by Doll.  
Results of this study showed significant MBDT performance differences as a function of 
interpreting the motivated (i.e., treatment) versus the unmotivated (i.e., control) task condition.  
Despite the numerical task being identical in the two conditions, control participants were 
approximately five times more likely to answer correctly than their treatment counterparts. Only 
the context of the scenario presented—the subject matter to which the participants were told the 
data referred—was different. Given no other detected group differences, it is likely that these 
differences in performance are due to this difference in context, thereby supporting the 
conclusion that treatment participants were more biased—motivatedly so—in their reading of the 
MBDT data table.  
These findings are consistent with Kahan et al. (2017) who showed that the MBDT was a 
difficult task overall, and that performance on the task was much worse when subjects were 
presented with the motivated bias scenario. Like Kahan, we attribute this difference in group 
performance to motivated confirmation bias. Doll et al. (2011) identified three dopaminergic 
genes, DRD2, DARPP-32, and COMT, that were predictive of unmotivated confirmation bias.  
Thus, we examined whether the same SNPs in dopaminergic genes underlying these reward 
prediction errors—and responsible for individual differences in susceptibility to unmotivated 
confirmation bias—would also account for differences in motivated confirmation bias and, at 
least partially, account for the observed performance differences.  
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The present investigation found no relationship between genotypes and accuracy on a 
motivated confirmation bias detection test. Separate analyses for each gene revealed odds of 
accurately interpreting the data table differed only by group assignment with no effect of 
genotype. In additional analyses, we also examined specific allelic groupings. In Doll et al. 
(2011), behavioral differences associated with the three genes of interest were detected when 
grouping by the presence or absence of an allele, thereby creating two groups or genotypes for 
each gene. In these groupings, heterozygotes were included with one or the other homozygous 
groups. Therefore, we sought to replicate this approach to determine whether the binary 
reclassification of the genes revealed an underlying effect not detected by our first analysis. Prior 
to conducting these analyses, we first examined the equality of the distribution of the binary gene 
classification in the control and treatment groups: DRD2 was classified based on the presence or 
absence of the T allele, DARPP-32 on the basis of the presence or absence of the C allele, and 
COMT on the basis of the presence or absence of the Met allele. Results showed no differences 
in the distributions of the genotypes across the groups; therefore, we re-examined our models 
using the binary allele groupings. Findings were consistent with our broader analysis; only group 
assignment successfully predicted the odds of accurately interpreting the MBDT data table.  
If correct, these findings may suggest that distinct genetic determinants of the dopamine reward 
system underlie motivated and unmotivated confirmation biases. This is a lingering possibility in 
the young field of research into the neurobiology of cognitive biases, and it is due to the 
difficulty in studying the neurobiology of motivated confirmation bias—an exceedingly 
complex, real-world phenomenon (Rollwage et al., 2020).  
Alternatively, the relationship between these dopaminergic polymorphisms and 
motivated confirmation bias may be more complex than considered here. An example of just 
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such an explanation was seen above in Byrne et al. (2016), who hypothesized that the opposing 
findings from Doll et al. (2011) and Collins and Frank (2012) on the association between 
DARPP-32 and reinforcement learning may have been due to differences in the task. One of 
those tasks involved classification of novel symbols, while the other involved classification of 
familiar symbols, a cognitive difference which might employ distinct neural processes.  
Similarly, while Talluri et al. (2018) showed that post-choice perceptual sensitivity is 
increased for choice-consistent stimuli, Rollwage et al. (2020) showed that confidence level in 
the initial choice may better explain post-selection bias. In short, prior research suggests that 
there is more than one possible explanation why the dopaminergic polymorphisms predictive of 
unmotivated confirmation bias were not predictive of motivated confirmation bias in the present 
study. It may be that these polymorphisms do not participate in these two cognitively distinct 
biases. Alternatively, if they do participate in both types of confirmation bias, they may do so as 
part of more complex, distinct mechanisms that involve other variables not examined here. One 
such candidate variable for future research is confidence, as it may be more extreme in the 
motivated form of confirmation bias.  
Doll et al. (2011) found that differences at these SNPs in the three genes of interest were 
predictive of individual differences in susceptibility to confirmation bias. Specifically, T allele 
carriers in DRD2 (rs6277), T allele carriers in DARPP-32 (rs907094), and Met allele carriers in 
COMT (rs4680), all demonstrated significantly more susceptibility to unmotivated confirmation 
bias. Were these same allelic differences part of a single neurobiological cause of both motivated 
and unmotivated confirmation bias, they would have been predictive of accuracy in the present 
study’s MBDT. We reasoned that RPEs are the probable determinant of both types of 
confirmation bias, and as such, SNPs in dopaminergic genes whose function is related to RPEs in 
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unmotivated confirmation bias would also be related to motivated confirmation bias. On the 
other hand, motivated and unmotivated confirmation bias are cognitively and behaviorally 
separable. This may be due to distinct neurological mechanisms underlying these phenomena. 
While future research will have to identify probable genetic and neurobiological markers for 
susceptibility to motivated confirmation bias, it remains possible that these will regulate 
dopamine in RPE function. 
Not having found main effects for any of the genes of interest, we conducted secondary 
analyses to examine whether numeracy, political party identity, or political philosophy affected 
the odds of correctly interpreting a motivated bias task. Kahan previously showed that 
congruency between political identity and data table assignment predicted accuracy, whereas 
incongruency predicted inaccuracy. In other words, when participants read a data table that 
confirmed their prior beliefs, they were more likely to interpret that table correctly than 
participants who read a table that contradicted their prior beliefs. Findings of the present study 
did not confirm this association – we found no effects for party identity or political ideology after 
controlling for group assignment.  
Numeracy, or the facility with which one understands and is able to work with numbers, 
is believed to enhance one’s ability to apply rational thinking or judgment in the face of a variety 
of problem sets. In the literature on numeracy and comprehending medical data for weighing 
health risks, for example, higher numeracy associated with getting medical treatment, adhering 
to instructions for the use of medications, understanding screenings risks, and better health 
outcomes overall (Reyna et al., 2009). However, prior research has shown that even when 
individuals possess cognitive problem-solving skills such as high numeracy, these skills confer 
no additional benefit when motivated reasoning is at play. For example, Kahan et al. (2017) 
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showed that performance differed between motivated and unmotivated task conditions but found 
no effect of numeracy in the motivated scenario. The present study, by contrast, found that even 
after controlling for group assignment, numeracy was still associated with increased odds of 
accurately responding in the MBDT task. So, unlike Kahan et al., who found that numeracy had 
no effect in the motivated condition, we showed that numeracy is predictive of accuracy in both 
motivated and unmotivated scenarios in certain populations. 
Why does numeracy confer any benefit at all? In both Kahan’s study and the control 
condition in the present study, numeracy conveyed an advantage that was predictive of accuracy. 
This is because numeracy is a measure of facility with numerical information (Peters et al., 
2006), and the tasks in both experiments were fundamentally numerical tasks—namely, 
interpreting data tables. This is consistent with the broader body of judgment and decision-
making research showing that numeracy is predictive of optimal, rational outcomes in a variety 
of numerical tasks, from understanding risk in medical decision-making (Reyna et al., 2009) to 
completing formal education and maintaining employment (Parsons & Bynner, 2005). Thus, 
numeracy typically conveys a performance advantage in narrow numerical tasks as well as 
broader endeavors that rely on numerical reasoning. The importance of Kahan et al.’s (2017) 
finding is that it showed this advantage was wiped away in the face of motivated confirmation 
bias.  
 Why, in confronting motivated confirmation bias, did numeracy offer a benefit to our 
participants, whereas for Kahan’s, it did not? We suspect the difference lies in the populations 
from which our respective samples were taken. Kahan et al.’s participants were 1111 adults, with 
a mean age of 48 years, recruited through an online testing firm. Our participants were 200 
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university students with a mean age of 19 years who participated in a university setting for class 
credit. Age and/or setting may be critical determinants of performance on the MBDT.  
Since the numerical tasks in the treatment and control conditions of the MBDT are 
identical, and only the explanations about subject matter to which the data refer are different, we 
conclude that the finding of a main effect for group assignment is the result of motivated 
confirmation bias. None of the potential genetic differences or political beliefs explored in this 
study explained this effect. That these latter predictors did not have any significant effects on 
outcome was most likely due to a non-normal, low kurtosis, distribution of party identity and 
political ideology. Figures 5 and 6 show the distributions of party identity and political 
philosophy broken down by correct and incorrect responses on the MBDT. In the sample, 
participants’ party identity and political philosophy clustered around the center and away from 
the tails of the distribution. As a result, there may have been too few extreme political party 
affiliations and too few extreme political philosophies to show an effect on MBDT accuracy. We 
explored alternative classification of these scale scores which resulted in no difference in the 
findings. 
Further, the sample largely consisted of university freshmen and sophomores enrolled in 
an introductory psychology course at a southern university. It is possible that in this 
demographic, views on gun control—the context in which the treatment group data were 
presented—are less variable than elsewhere in the United States, and not captured by measures 
of political party or political philosophy. 
Limitations 
 
 We hypothesized that because both motivated and unmotivated confirmation bias likely 
operate as the result of RPEs, the same dopaminergic gene SNPs that are predictive of individual 
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differences in unmotivated confirmation bias would also be predictive of motivated confirmation 
bias. Results of the present study did not confirm this hypothesis and instead suggests that the 
neurobiological mechanisms that account for individual differences in susceptibility to motivated 
confirmation bias may differ and remain to be discovered. While alternative biomarkers have yet 
to be identified to account for such neurobiological differences, it is reasonable for future 
research to take one of two approaches. The first is to examine whether there are alternatives to 
RPEs that can serve as the underlying processes that produce confirmation bias. If there are not, 
future research should examine biomarkers that produce differences in dopamine regulation as 
alternatives. Like the polymorphisms in DRD2 and DARPP-32, these might directly affect 
dopamine availability in the striatum. Like COMT, however, prospective biomarkers might have 
only second- or third-order effects on the striatum while having their primary effects elsewhere 
(the PFC in the case of COMT) and then influence the striatum through neuronal projections 
from one region to another.  
 The sample size of 200 may not have been large enough to detect the putative effects of 
political party identity and political philosophy on accuracy in the MBDT, as effects sizes were 
lower than anticipated. A larger sample size from this population of 18-19-year-old university 
students might detect such effects. Alternatively, a broader and more age diverse population 
might be one in which political party affiliation and political philosophy are more indicative of 
beliefs and biases about gun control and gun issues.  
One alternative approach to overcome the apparent disconnect between the detected bias 
on gun control, and the undetected bias connected to political measures, might be to include a 
scenario for which university students’ views are more closely connected to their political 
commitments. Had we envisioned such a disconnect in the study sample, additional measures of 
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attitudes on gun control issues could have been included to further explore this possibility. These 
might be simple measures like Likert scales capturing one’s support for gun control, or validated 
tools like the scale developed by Teske & Hazlett (1985) for measuring attitudes toward handgun 
control specifically. Such measures would give an indication of prior beliefs that could serve as a 
ground for motivated confirmation bias. If successful, they would show up in the control group 
as a difference in accuracy between participants whose prior beliefs and table assignment (gun 
control is effective at reducing violence, or gun control is ineffective at reducing violence) were 
aligned, and those whose beliefs and table assignment were incongruous. 
Conclusions 
 The data presented here are evidence that the genetic and neurobiological determinants of 
motivated and unmotivated confirmation bias are distinct. Nevertheless, the biological 
mechanisms underlying motivated confirmation bias remain to be discovered. Future research 
should seek to replicate the present findings and identify biomarkers of interest in the 
neurobiological architecture of RPEs and dopamine regulation. That numeracy provides some 
benefit in the face of motivated confirmation bias, in at least some populations, is also a novel 
finding that warrants efforts at replication and further explanation. A better understanding of the 
precise conditions under which numeracy can be harnessed to combat motivated confirmation 
bias may provide additional tools in the effort to augment cognitive performance and improve 
rational judgment and decision-making.  
Finally, this is a young field of research that is still developing research methods for 
examining complex real-world phenomena. Imaging work like that from Kaplan et al. (2016) can 
examine the neural correlates of emotionally and cognitively complex processes, like resistance 
to changing one’s mind on political topics. However, imaging studies can only go so far. Kaplan 
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et al.’s work may be useful in identifying areas of activity where others may look for candidate 
mechanisms that explain such complex processes. It is also the case that findings from individual 
studies showing relationships between dopaminergic polymorphisms and relatively simple 
cognitive processes have not always survived examination in meta-analyses. Progress in our 
understanding of the neurobiology of simpler cognitive biases may be necessary to 
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Table 1 
 
Treatment and Control Group Statistics for Age, Sex, Party Identity, Political Philosophy, and 
Numeracy Score 
 Treatment Control t/2 p-value 
N 
 
104 96   
Age 
 
19.19 (3.31) 18.72 (1.24) 1.32 .189 
Sex (M/F) 44/60 28/68 3.74 .053 
     
Political Philosophy     4.230 .376 
     
Very Liberal 6 (5.8%) 4 (4.2%)   
     
Liberal 32 (30.8%) 27 (28.1%)   
     
Moderate 27 (26.0%) 34 (35.4%)   
     
Conservative 30 (28.8%) 34 (35.4%)   
     
Very Conservative 1 (0.01%) 5 (5.2%)   
     
Party Identity   .632 .123 
     
Strong Democrat  4 (3.8%) 2 (2.1%)   
     
Democrat 18 (17.3%) 22 (22.9%)   
     
Independent Lean 
Democrat 
20 (19.2%) 21 (21.9%)   
 
Independent 
    
13 (12.5%) 13 (13.5%)   
     
Independent Lean 
Republican 
18 (17.3%) 11 (11.5%)   
     
Republican 21 (20.2%) 25 (26.0%)   
     
Strong Republican 2 (1.9%) 10 (10.4%)   
 
Note. Means (SD) and t-tests were used for age and numeracy score; Frequencies and chi-square  
 
tests were used for gender, party identity, political philosophy. 
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Table 2 
Allele Frequency (%) in Treatment and Control Groups for Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms in 
Three Genes of Interest: DRD2, DARPP-32, and COMT 
Gene Treatment Control 2 p-value 
DRD2   8.176 .017 
C/C  23 (22.1%) 29 (30.2%)   
T/T 37 (35.6%) 17 (17.7%)   
C/T 44 (42.3%) 50 (52.1%)   
DARPP-32   2.374 .305 
C/C 50 (48.1%) 51 (53.1%)   
T/T 16 (15.4%) 8 (8.3%)   
C/T 38 (36.5%) 37 (38.5%)   
COMT   3.012 .222 
VAL/VAL 24 (23.1%) 13 (13.5%)   
MET/MET 33 (31.7%) 34 (35.4%)   
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Table 3 
 
Frequency (%) of Allele Presence in Treatment and Control Groups for Each of Three Genes of 
Interest: DRD2, DARPP-32, and COMT 
Presence of allele Treatment Control 2 p-value 
DRD2 T allele  81 (77.9%) 67 (69.8%) 1.699 .192 
    
DARPP-32 C allele 88 (84.6%) 88 (91.8%) 2.350 .125 
    

































 71  
Table 4 
 
Logistic Regression Analysis of MBDT Accuracy for Each of Three Genes of Interest: DRD2, 
DARPP-32, and COMT 
Model β SE β Wald’s 2 df p 
Odds 
Ratio 
DRD2       
Constant -.806 .171 22.125 1 <.001  
Group  
(0 = control, 1 = treatment) 
-.8159 .175 21.686 1 < .001 .196 
Table  
(0 = ineffective, 1 = effective) 
.024 .165 .021 1 .884 1.049 
TT allele (vs. CC) .245 .257 .912 1 .340 1.203 
CT allele (vs. CC) -.305 .223 1.882 1 .170 .694 
       
DARPP-32       
Constant -.944 .213 19.67 1 <.001  
Group  -.766 .169 20.434 1 < .001 .216 
Table  -.003 .164 .000 1 .986 .994 
TT allele (vs. CC) .287 .371 .595 1 .440 .709 
CT allele (vs. CC) .229 .258 .786 1 .375 1.186 
       
COMT       
Constant -.899 .183 24.039 1 <.001  
Group  -.779 .171 20.776 1 < .001 .211 
Table  .008 .164 .002 1 .960 1.017 
VV allele (vs. MM) .018 .292 .004 1 .952 1.317 












 72  
Table 5 
 
Logistic Regression Analysis of MBDT Accuracy for Each of Three Genes of Interest, DRD2, 
DARPP-32, and COMT, with Genotypes Regrouped for the Presence of an Allele of Interest. 
Model β SE β Wald’s 2 df p 
Odds 
Ratio 
DRD2       
Constant -.817 .187 19.165 1 <.001  
Group  
(0 = control, 1 = treatment) 
-.768 .169 20.659 1 < .001 .215 
Table  
(0 = ineffective, 1 = effective) 
.001 .163 .000 1 .995 1.002 
TT & CT alleles (vs. CC) -.089 .181 .241 1 .624 .837 
       
DARPP-32       
Constant -1.022 .279 13.409 1 <.001  
Group  -.764 .169 20.407 1 < .001 .217 
Table  -.006 .164 .001 1 .972 .988 
CC & CT alleles (vs. TT) .209 .278 .566 1 .452 1.520 
       
COMT       
Constant -.867 .217 15.938 1 <.001  
Group  -.774 .170 20.782 1 < .001 .213 
Table  -.002 .163 .000 1 .990 .996 
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Figure 1  
 




Note. Experimental task table and instructions presented to some participants in the control 
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Figure 2  
 




Note. Experimental task table and instructions presented to some participants in the control 
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Figure 3 
 




Note. Experimental task table and instructions presented to some participants in the treatment 
group. When interpreted correctly, this table indicates that the ban on carrying concealed 
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Figure 4 
 




Note. Experimental task table and instructions presented to some participants in the treatment 
group. When interpreted correctly, this table indicates that the ban on carrying concealed 
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Figure 5  
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Figure 6  
 
Accuracy Across the Distribution of Responses to Party Identity Scale 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
